The IntraBuild ecosystem forms the cornerstone of Chin Hin’s corporate strategy, integrating the Group’s upstream, midstream and downstream activities across Building Materials Manufacturing and Trading, Construction Engineering, Property Development and Home & Living solutions (page 29 of Annual Report 2025).

On the upside, this approach enhances operational synergies, improves earnings visibility and mitigates certain external disruptions throughout the project lifecycle. On the contrary, it may also increase interdependencies among the Group’s business segments, e.g., a slowdown in project launches within the Property Development segment could result in a cascading impact on the demand for Construction Engineering, Building Materials and related offerings.

• To what extent is the Group’s earnings profile exposed to such concentration and interdependency risks?

• Accordingly, what is the proportion of revenue and profit generated from internally sourced projects and third-party customers over the past three financial years?

• Given the cyclical nature of the property and construction sectors, how does the Group assess and manage the risk that a slowdown in any one segment could trigger adverse knock-on effects across the broader IntraBuild ecosystem?

• From a strategic perspective, what is the Group’s target balance between internal and external revenue sources? Does the current level of reliance on internal projects remain appropriate and sustainable over the long term?

• To what degree is each business segment commercially sustainable and competitive on a standalone basis, without undue reliance on projects originating from within the Group?

1. Consolidated gearing at 47% leaves Genting with little room to manoeuver as it simultaneously funds the RWS 2.0 overhaul and the expansion at New York Aqueduct site.

• The rating downgrade by Moody’s to Baa3, the lowest investment grade, from Baa2 reflects Genting’s prolonged deleveraging and amid slower recovery (Source: The Edge, 8 December 2025)

• What specific leverage triggers or internal thresholds will prompt management to slow down on Capex to protect the Group’s investment-grade rating?

2. The operating challenges at RWLV, particularly the decline in visitor traffic and the need to continue waiving resort and parking fees through the end of 2025, are a concern. While the roll out of an upgraded hotel management system, enabling full ownership and control of its customer database is an important step in modernizing customer engagement capabilities, it is fundamentally a backend initiative.

• What new customer insights or data-driven capabilities will the new system provide that were not previously available, and how will these be used to improve customer acquisition, retention and spending? More importantly, when does management expect the platform to begin generating a measurable increase in higher-margin repeat visitation and casino-hosted play sufficient to offset the revenue impact of the fee waivers?

To secure a downstate New York commercial license, RWNYC committed to a USD600 million upfront fee and a USD5.5 billion expansion roadmap through 2030. Funding the license fee required drawing down USD755 million from a new credit facility, triggering a 34% spike in finance costs that drove a 1Q2026 net loss of RM25.2 million. Notably, while tier-one global operators withdrew from the race due to regulatory hurdles and low expected returns, Genting accepted a steep 56% slot tax rate to proceed.

• Why does the Board believe GenM can extract a viable, wealth-creating return from this asset when global competitors with much larger balance sheets concluded that the regulatory hurdles and high tax structures made the numbers mathematically unviable? What proprietary operational advantages does the executive team possess that justify overriding the cautionary stance taken by the rest of the global gaming industry?

• The USD5.5 billion expansion plan requires precise, long-term capital execution. What explicit fixed-price engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contracts have been signed to insulate Genting Malaysia from localised raw material and labour cost inflation in New York? If construction cost overruns cause the required capital expenditure to exceed USD5.5 billion materially, what fallback funding mechanisms are available to the Group?

1. The Group has identified climate risks, including flooding and transition risks, but has not quantified the financial impact. (Source: Page 125 and 126 of Annual Report 2025)

• When will the Board be able to disclose estimated climate-related capex, potential asset impairment exposure and expected impact on margins and cash flows?

2. The physical climate risk assessment currently covers only seven townships and relies on high-level desktop tools. (Source: Page 203 of Annual Report 2025)

• What percentage of the Group’s total landbank, GDV and investment assets has not yet been assessed for physical climate risk?

Bayan Development Sdn. Bhd. (“Plaintiff” or “BDSB”) has commenced civil proceedings on 8 December 2025 against Siaw Swee Hin, Tai Hock Teong, and Pegasus Heights Berhad (“PHB”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) via a Writ of Summons dated the same date.

The claim against PHB amounts to RM3,200,334, allegedly relating to payments made for Project Management Consultancy Services which were not rendered under a Letter of Award dated 5 June 2015. PHB has denied the allegations and has also filed a counterclaim.

As at the reporting date, the matter remains ongoing and is subject to court proceedings, with no admission of liability by PHB. (Source: Page 157 of AR2025)

• The allegation that services were not rendered despite payment raises concerns over possible weaknesses in internal controls and verification processes and may require further independent review.

• Has an independent review been undertaken to verify the delivery of the consultancy services and to assess whether there were any possible control weaknesses in the payment approval process?

• Did the Internal Audit function review this project and the related consultancy payments, and if so, what were the key findings and recommendations arising from the review? Please explain.

• Has the Board considered the worst-case financial impact of the RM3,200,334 claim together with legal costs, and its effect on the Group’s overall financial position?